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III. SCOPE OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
AND METHODS OF PRODUCTION*
A. Introduction
With approximately 90% of documents now originating in
electronic form,' "electronic discovery has moved from an unusual
activity encountered in large cases to a frequently-seen
activity ..... , 2 Thus, understanding the challenges and defining the
scope of electronic discovery and production has become ever more
critical for attorneys and courts.
For instance, attorneys and their clients need to grapple with
practical issues related to the volume, format, and platforms of
electronic documents. "The sheer volume of [electronic] data, when
compared with conventional paper documentation, can be
staggering.... A CD-ROM, with 650 megabytes, can hold up to
325,000 typewritten pages.... [C]orporate computer networks create
backup data measured in terabytes ... [. E]ach terabyte represents
the equivalent of 500 billion typewritten pages of plain text."3 The
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1. In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D 437, 440 n.2 (D.N.J.
2002) ("According to a University of California study, 93% of all information
generated during 1999 was generated in digital form, on computers." (quoting
Kenneth J. Withers, Electronic Discovery: The Challenges and Opportunities
of Electronic Evidence, Address at the National Workshop for Magistrate
Judges, San Diego, Cal. (July, 24 2001))).
2. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITEE 2 (2004) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE], http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAugO4.pdf.
3. Id. at 3 (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.446 (4th ed.
2004)).
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breadth of formats of discoverable electronic documents has been
described as including:
[V]oice mail messages and files, back-up voice mail files,
e-mail messages and files, backup e-mail files, deleted e-
mails, data files, program files, backup and archival tapes,
temporary files, system history files, web site information
stored in textual, graphical or audio format, web site log
files, cache files, cookies, and other electronically-recorded
information.
4
Platforms that might be searched for volumes of these types of
electronic data include databases, servers, networks, existing and
legacy computer software and hardware systems, archives, backup
and disaster recovery systems, storage media such as tapes and discs,
laptops, personal computers, internet data, personal digital assistants,
mobile phones, pagers and other handheld wireless devices, and
voice messaging and other audio systems. 5 Further, production may
be requested in paper, original electronic format, or both and may
need to be delivered in a searchable format and/or accompanied by
"the software necessary to retrieve, read or interpret electronic
information."
6
This part addresses the challenges posed by electronic discovery
and production 7 and highlights how it differs from traditional
4. Super Film of Am., Inc. v. UCB Films, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 649, 657 (D.
Kan. 2004) (quoting Kleiner v. Bums, 48 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 644, 649 (D.
Kan. 2000); see also AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT 103B, AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL
DISCOVERY STANDARDS 3, 8 (2004) [hereinafter AMENDMENTS TO ABA CIVIL
DISCOVERY STANDARDS] (identifying potentially discoverable electronic
information formats as e-mail, word processing documents, spreadsheets,
presentation documents, graphics, animations, images, audio and/or visual
recordings and voicemail), http://www.abanet.org/litigation/documents/
hod/ABA%20Final%20Revised%202004%20Amendments%2OCivil%2ODisc
overy/o20Standards.doc; supra Part II.
5. AMENDMENTS TO ABA CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 4, at
3-4.
6. Id. at 4-5.
7. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(West) 1159, 1160 (W.D. Tenn. 2003);
Producing electronic data requires, at minimum, several steps: (1)
designing and applying a search program to identify potentially
relevant electronic files; (2) reviewing the resulting files for relevance;
(3) reviewing the resulting files for privilege; (4) deciding whether the
files should be produced in electronic or printed form; and (5) actual
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discovery. It notes that the underlying principles of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) 26 still apply to serve as a guide to
practitioners grappling with the scope of discovery issues and
attendant matters.8  While the prevailing sentiment is that
"[e]lectronic discovery injects difficult, expensive and contentious
issues into many otherwise routine disputes," 9 in the seminal case of
Hickman v. Taylor l° Justice Murphy admonished that discovery is a
method "to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties,
and [serve] as a device for ascertaining facts, or information as to the
existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues.''' That
discovery is to be construed liberally, yet within "ultimate and
necessary boundaries"' 2 based on necessity or justification, 13 remains
apt nearly 60 years later in the context of electronic discovery.
14
Thus, this part will describe how courts prefer opposing parties to
themselves agree upon the scope of electronic discovery and the
method of production. It will also describe how the courts have
attempted to solve difficult matters of electronic discovery when they
have been required to intervene.
Also included is an overview of how courts have ruled on
requests for expedited discovery and preservation orders, defined the
scope of electronic discovery within each of the two tiers of
production.
8. See Jones v. Goord, No. 95 CIV. 8026(GEL), 2002 WL 1007614, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2002) (noting that careful application of the principles
behind the existing rules on a case-by-case basis make the rules flexible
enough to deal with the special problems created by requests for discovery of
electronic data).
9. AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT 103B, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO
AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS (2004), http://www.
abanet.org/litigation/documents/hod/4%20Executive%20Summary/2O 2004%
20Electronic%20Discovery/o20Standards.DOC.
10. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,501 (1947).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 507.
13. See id. at 509-10.
14. See Bishop v. Hoffnann-LaRoche, Inc., No. 8:02-CV-1533-T-30-TBM,
2003 WL 23728321 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2003) ("[T]here can be little dispute
that electronic information contained in computers used by Charles Bishop
prior to his suicide.., satisfies the broad relevance test of Rule 26(b)(1). Such
information is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence about... the fundamental issue of why [he] crashed [the]
plane .... ).
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discovery created by the amendments to FRCP 26 in 2000, defined
the method of production of electronic documents, applied the
availability of electronic documents to interrogatories, and ruled on
requests for sanctions related to failure to produce electronic
documents.
B. Preparing for the FRCP 26() Conference
With limited exceptions, no discovery can occur before the
FRCP 26(f) conference between the parties, except by order of the
court.' 5  Both plaintiff and defense counsel ought to adopt a
pragmatic approach to preparation for the discovery conference and
to potential requests for or objections to electronic discovery.'
6
Given the technical complexities, there is an interrelationship
between how well attorneys have understood their clients' or
adversaries' computer systems and requests for electronic discovery
throughout the life of a case. 17 In other words, it is advisable for
requesting counsel to understand early what efforts the opposing side
will need to undertake to produce electronic documents and to decide
in what form it would like to receive such documents. 18 Similarly,
15. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(d) ("[Timing and Sequence of Discovery.] Except in
categories of proceedings exempted from initial disclosure under Rule
26(a)(1)(E), or when authorized under these rules or by order or agreement of
the parties, a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties
have conferred as required by Rule 26(f).").
16. See Jones v. Goord, No. 95 CIV. 8026(GEL), 2002 WL 1,007,614, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2002) ("As electronic mechanisms for storing and
retrieving data have become more common, it has increasingly behooved
courts and counsel to become familiar with such methods, and to develop
expertise and procedures for incorporating 'electronic discovery' into the
familiar rituals of litigation.").
17. See id. at *1, *10-* 11, *16 (holding that the burden of discovery of
information from prison database systems about disease and violence due to
double-celling inmates outweighed the benefit where the defendant prison
provided a detailed description of the construction and operation of its
information systems as well as the disruption and security risks such discovery
would create while the plaintiff prisoners claimed such discovery would be
simple and cheap without any technical substantiation or grasp of the
defendant's database systems).
18. Cf DIST. N.J. R. 26.1(d)(2):
Duty to Notify. A party seeking discovery of computer-based or other
digital information shall notify the opposing party as soon as possible,
but no [later] than the Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) conference, and identify as
clearly as possible the categories of information which may be sought.
1594
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attorneys should assess what electronic data their client have, how
they were created and saved, and how difficult they will be to
produce in anticipation of discovery requests.19
Courts prefer that the parties take a pragmatic rather than a
combative approach to defining discovery early in the process, as
courts prefer not to have to intervene.20 Further, the duty to preserve
potentially discoverable electronic documents may attach as early as
when a party could anticipate litigation.21 The duty to preserve
A party may supplement its request for computer-based and other
digital information as soon as possible upon receipt of new
information relating to digital evidence.
19. See id. R. 26.1(d)(1):
Duty to Investigate and Disclose. Prior to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)
conference, counsel shall review with the client the client's
information management systems including computer-based and other
digital systems, in order to understand how information is stored and
how it can be retrieved. To determine what must be disclosed pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), counsel shall further review with the client
the client's information files, including currently maintained computer
files as well as historical, archival, back-up, and legacy computer files,
whether in current or historic media or formats, such as digital
evidence which may be used to support claims or defenses. Counsel
shall also identify a person or persons with knowledge about the
client's information management systems, including computer-based
and other digital systems, with the ability to facilitate, through
counsel, reasonably anticipated discovery.
20. See Goord, 2002 WL 1007614, at *15 ("Parties should be encouraged
to work out differences amicably; ... the spirit of cooperation and
informality.., alone make[] effective discovery and settlement possible in
overburdened courts."); see also DIST. WYO. R. 26.1 (d):
(3) Prior to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) conference, counsel should
carefully investigate their client's information management system so
that they are knowledgeable as to its operation, including how
information is stored and how it can be retrieved. Likewise, counsel
shall reasonably review the client's computer files to ascertain the
contents thereof, including archival and legacy data (outdated formats
or media), and disclose in initial discovery (self-executing routine
discovery) the computer based evidence which may be used to support
claims or defenses.
(A) Duty to Notify. A party seeking discovery of computer-based
information shall notify the opposing party immediately, but no
later than the Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) conference of that fact and
identify as clearly as possible the categories of information which
may be sought.
21. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
("The duty to preserve attached at the time that litigation was reasonably
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"covers the discoverable information that a party knows or
reasonably should know may be relevant to the pending or
impending litigation." 22 Thus the duty to preserve does not require a
court order. Nonetheless, as electronic documents are more
vulnerable to early destruction, 24 courts are plied with requests for
orders to compel early discovery and requests for preservation or
restraining orders to "freeze" a company's computer system with
some freqluency, even prior to the Rule 26(f) conference.
1. Requests for Early Discovery
Parties to litigation have greater reason to be concerned about
the destruction of documents in the electronic environment.2 ' In
anticipated.... [A]nyone who anticipates being a party or is a party to a
lawsuit must not destroy unique, relevant evidence that might be useful to an
adversary."); accord Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223 F.R.D.
162, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247
F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02 C
6832, 2003 WL 22439865, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003); Thompson v. United
States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 99 (D. Md. 2003)
(quoting Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2001)); Renda
Marine, Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 57, 61 (2003). But see Danis v. USN
Communications, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 828, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(describing the duty to preserve as beginning on the day litigation
commenced).
22. Danis, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 875.
23. See id. at 843 (describing the inherent duty to preserve as a common
law duty); Arista Records, Inc. v. Sakfield Holding Co., 314 F. Supp. 2d 27, 33
(D.D.C. 2004) ("Defendant's argument that it destroyed crucial evidence [prior
to a court order, but after notification that a copyright infringement claim had
been made against it,] to prevent further transfer of music files is without doubt
one of the most ludicrous arguments ever visited upon this Court in written
form."); Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 100 ("While a litigant certainly may...
seek a court order directing that [an adversary preserve electronic records
during the pendency of a case], it is not required, and a failure to do so does
not vitiate the independent obligation of an adverse party to preserve such
information." (footnote omitted)).
24. Cf Convolve, 223 F.R.D. at 176 ("Since computer systems generally
have automatic deletion features that periodically purge electronic documents
such as e-mail, it is necessary for a party facing litigation to take active steps to
halt that process.")
25. See Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 650-51
(D. Minn. 2002) (noting that the plaintiff requested expedited discovery and an
order to compel early discovery of electronic documents prior to a Rule 26(f)
conference in addition to the court's order admonishing the defendant to
preserve paper and electronic documents because "data from a computer which
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some instances, the parties "stipulate [to a] protective order
prohibiting the destruction of discoverable [electronic] evidence by
either party" thus adding a layer of court protection to an agreement
negotiated between themselves. 26 In other instances, the discovering
party asks the court for expedited discovery prior to the Rule 26(f)
conference.
27
One court granted such expedited discovery "to ensure that
computer records [were] preserved., 28 It also assured the producing
party that while "discovery [would] commence earlier than would
usually be the case,"2 9 it would have the usual amount of time under
the Federal Rules to respond to discovery.30  To ensure the
effectiveness of expedited discovery, a court may couple other orders
with an order for expedited discovery. For instance, a computer
forensics expert could be employed to create a mirror image of the
producing party's computer systems. 31 The producing party would
then receive a copy of its data to sift through in response to discovery
requests in the usual manner, while the requesting party would be
assured that the data was protected from destruction as of a certain
date.32 The court might further protect the producing party by
instructing the computer forensics expert to "use its best efforts to
avoid unnecessarily disrupting the normal activities or business
operations of the [producing party] while inspecting, copying, and
has been deleted remains on the hard drive, but is constantly being overwritten,
irretrievably, by the Defendant's continued use of that equipment").
26. Kleiner v. Bums, 48 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 644, 648 n.4 (D. Kan.
2000).
27. See Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 650-51.
28. Id. at 651; accord Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Sys., Inc., CA-03-
1193-A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22868, at *29-*30 (E.D. Va. Dec. 5,
2003)("[T]his case presents the Court with unusual circumstances or
conditions that would likely prejudice the party if they were required to wait
the normal time to initiate discovery. In this case, electronic evidence is at
issue. Electronic evidence can easily be erased and manipulated.").
29. Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 651.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 653-54; see also Physicians Interactive, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22868, at *30 (granting the plaintiff "limited expedited discovery to enter the
sites where the computers used in the alleged [hacking] attacks are located and
to obtain a 'mirror image' of the computer equipment containing electronic
data relating to Defendants' alleged attacks on [plaintiff]'s file server.., with
the assistance of a computer forensic expert").
32. See Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 653-54.
1597
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1591
imaging," 33 and by allowing the expert and the producing party to
access only copies of the entire set of preserved data.
34
2. Requests for Preservation Order
As with requests for expedited discovery, in the electronic
environment requests for preservation orders are rooted in a fear of
document destruction.35  The discovering party may believe that
expedited discovery, which does not preclude the producing party
from continuing to operate its information systems, does not
adequately protect its interests. Thus, the requesting party may ask
the court to issue a preservation order that compels the opposing
party to halt the use of its computer systems until discovery has been
conducted.
a. Reasonableness of request for preservation order
Freezing a company's computer systems can bring its operations
to a virtual halt.36 Thus, courts may choose to issue a preservation
order that does not have a tangible component, but rather
"reemphasize[s] that documents should not be destroyed and
create[s] incentives to ensure that happens." 37 For instance, the court
may remind the producing party of "the looming specter of
sanctions-which the case law suggests may be severe, to and
including the entry of a default judgment."
38
33. Id. at 653.
34. Id.
35. Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Servs. v. Riley, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385, 388
(Ct. App. 2003) ("[Plaintiff] sought to 'freeze' Defendants' electronically
stored data so that it would be available for future discovery, if appropriate,
and claimed that even Defendants' innocent use of the media could result in
the destruction of potential evidence.").
36. See REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2,
at 7-8 ("[T]he volume and dynamic nature of electronically stored information
may complicate preservation obligations.... Suspension of all or a significant
part of that activity could paralyze a party's operations. An overbroad
approach to preservation may be ... unduly burdensome for parties dependent
on computer systems for their operations.").
37. Pueblo of Laguna v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 133, 140 (2004); accord
Walker v. Cash Flow Consultants, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 613, 617 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
38. Pueblo of Laguna, 60 Fed. Cl. at 141. The court in this case provided
an exhaustive definition of types of data that various government agencies
must take internal steps to preserve to comply with the preservation order or
face sanctions:
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Courts have addressed the reasonableness of requests for
intrusive preservation in several ways. One test "requires that one
seeking a preservation order demonstrate that it is necessary and not
unduly burdensome." 39 To prove need, "the proponent ordinarily
must show that absent a court order, there is significant risk that
relevant evidence will be lost or destroyed-a burden often met by
demonstrating that the opposing party has lost or destroyed evidence
in the past or has inadequate retention procedures in place., 40 To
prove that a request for a preservation order is not overly
burdensome, "the proponent must show that the particular steps to be
adopted will be effective, but not overbroad-the court will neither
lightly exercise its inherent power to protect evidence nor indulge in
an exercise in futility."
41
Other courts view a "motion to preserve evidence [a]s an
injunctive remedy and [believe they] should issue [such an order]
only upon an adequate showing that equitable relief is warranted. 42
Under this approach, each federal circuit's standard for injunctive
relief would govern the review of requests for preservation orders.
43
"Documents, data, and tangible things" is to be interpreted broadly to
include writings; records; files; correspondence; reports; memoranda;
calendars; diaries; minutes; electronic messages; voicemail; E-mail;
telephone message records or logs; computer and network activity
logs; hard drives; backup data; removable computer storage media
such as tapes, disks, and cards; printouts; document image files; Web
pages; databases; spreadsheets; software; books; ledgers; journals;
orders; invoices; bills; vouchers; checks; statements; worksheets;
summaries; compilations; computations; charts; diagrams; graphic
presentations; drawings; films; charts; digital or chemical process
photographs; video; phonographic tape; or digital recordings or
transcripts thereof; drafts; jottings; and notes. Information that serves
to identify, locate, or link such material, such as file inventories, file
folders, indices, and metadata, is also included in this definition.
Id. at 143.
39. Id. at 138.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Madden v. Wyeth, No. 3-03-CV-0167-R., 2003 WL 21443404, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2003) (citing Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Olean v. Cargill,
Inc., No. 3-95-784, 1995 WL 783610, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 1995) (citing
Humble Oil and Ref. Co. v. Harang, 262 F. Supp. 39, 42 (E.D. La. 1966))).
43. Cf Madden, 2003 WL 21443404, at *1 ("In the Fifth Circuit, a party
must establish a substantial threat of irreparable harm in order to obtain an
injunction. Plaintiffs have made no such showing [in their motion to preserve
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In other instances, the plaintiffs request for intrusive court
action may take the form of an ex parte request for a temporary
restraining order.44 "Restraining order applications sought ex parte
require the court to serve as the absent party's advocate, triggering
intense judicial scrutiny of a plaintiffs claims, the relief it seeks, and
most importantly, its proffered justification for proceeding ex
parte."45 There are generally two situations in which a court may
issue a temporary restraining order.46 "First, a plaintiff may obtain
ex parte relief by showing that it is impossible to give notice to the
adverse party because the plaintiff does not know the party's identity
or location." 47 It is not likely that a plaintiff will be able to assert this
rationale for a restraining order where the request relates to freezing
or seizing the defendant's computer systems, because the plaintiff
probably needs to explain the threat to electronic documents that
would justify such an extreme order with some specificity that can
only come through knowledge of the defendant. 48 "The second and
remaining way a plaintiff may obtain an ex parte restraining order is
by showing that proceeding ex parte is the 'sole method of
preserving a state of affairs in which the court can provide effective
evidence]." (citations omitted)).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b):
A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral
notice to the adverse party or that party's attorney only if (1) it clearly
appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified
complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party's attorney
can be heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies to
the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give
the notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not
be required.
45. Adobe Sys., Inc. v. S. Sun Prods., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 636, 639 (S.D. Cal.
1999).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Cf id. at 637-39 (finding that the plaintiff software companies' exparte
application for a temporary restraining order, where the software companies
contended that their claim of copyright infringement by the jeweler could only
be proved by impounding the jeweler's computers without warning as
otherwise the jeweler could easily delete unlicensed copies of software, did not
and could not use lack of knowledge of identity or locale of the defendant
jeweler as a basis for obtaining the restraining order because the application
did necessarily identify the address and described the personnel and operations
of the jeweler).
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final relief,"' 49 which may be proved by the related showing that
notice to the defendant "would 'render fruitless further prosecution
of the action."' 5 The plaintiff's burden under this criterion is to do
more than merely allege that electronic evidence is easy to destroy.
51
To meet its burden, the plaintiff should "present specific facts
showing that the defendant it seeks to enjoin will likely conceal,
destroy, or alter evidence if it receives notice of the action. A
plaintiff may satisfy this burden by identifying specific instances
where the defendant has destroyed evidence or willfully violated
court orders in the past." 52 The plaintiff may also carry its burden by
linking "the defendant with other persons, engaged in similar
unlawful activities, who have destroyed evidence or violated court
orders in the past."
53
Overall, it appears that lawyers should have some understanding
of the opposing party's business operations and/or information
systems in order to fashion a request for an intrusive order with
specificity, and a defined rationale that the court can understand and
find credible.54 It is also suggested that the parties ought to confer
49. Id. at 639.
50. Id. at 643.
51. See id. at 641:
Once notified, a defendant can erase its computer disks, bum, shred,
or hide incriminating documents, and intimidate or coach potential
witnesses. This opportunity presents itself to defendants in all civil
cases, from high stakes technology disputes to routine personal injury
and small claims actions. The extraordinary remedy of ex parte
injunctive relief cannot be justified by merely pointing to the obvious
opportunity every defendant possesses to engage in such unlawful
deceptive conduct.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Madden v. Wyeth, No. 3-03-CV-0167-R., 2003 WL 21443404, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2003) (denying the plaintiff's motion to preserve
evidence, specifically the requests that the defendant "preserve all documents
and information, whether in paper or electronic format ... and [] suspend all
routine destruction of documents, including but not limited to recycling back-
up tapes, automated deletion of e-mail, and reformatting computer hard drives"
because the plaintiffs offered no proof that the defendants would spoliate
beyond a general assertion that the "defendants and their agents may
intentionally or unintentionally destroy relevant documents"); Adobe Sys., 187
F.R.D. at 642-43 (rejecting an unsupported assertion by the plaintiff software
companies that the defendant jeweler could destroy electronic evidence of
unlicensed software use with a few keystrokes and clicks of a mouse because
1601
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amongst themselves before involving the court. Just as with paper
discovery, FRCP 26 is meant to assist the parties in accomplishing
discovery and production without resort to intrusive orders by the
court.55
b. Knowledge of a client's computer systems
The earlier a lawyer understands the client's computer
environment, the more likely a court will be to find that the party met
its inherent duty to preserve and decline a request for a preservation
order from the other party. Adequate measures for preservation of
electronic documents include a clear policy regarding critical
electronic documents, backup sources of documents, proof that key
personnel are aware of and are implementing such policies and that
otherwise critical potentially discoverable documents are not subject
to spoliation by a computer simply being booted up or accessed.56
Knowledge of how information systems operate and implementation
of solid internal document retention policies also play a role in the
court's view on spoliation
57 and sanctions.58
the court's research found that it is generally difficult to completely erase
electronic evidence).
55. See Pueblo of Laguna v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 133, 140, 142
(2004) (instructing the litigants, where the court had entered a preservation
order that only reminded the parties of the inherent duty to preserve
discoverable documents, to meet, confer and submit a mutually agreeable plan
for a proposed court order on discovery matters to include "whether indexation
will require suspending or modifying any routine processes or procedures, with
special attention to document-management programs and the recycling of
computer data storage media"). See also infra Part III.C.
56. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218-19
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (footnotes omitted):
By its attorney's directive in August 2002, UBS endeavored to
preserve all backup tapes that existed in August 2001 (when Zubulake
filed her EEOC charge) that captured data for employees identified by
Zubulake in her document request, and all such monthly backup tapes
generated thereafter. These backup tapes existed in August 2002,
because of UBS's document retention policy, which required retention
for three years. In August 2001, UBS employees were instructed to
maintain active electronic documents pertaining to Zubulake in
separate files. Had these directives been followed, UBS would have
met its preservation obligations by preserving one copy of all relevant
documents that existed at, or were created after, the time when the
duty to preserve attached.
57. See infra Part VII.
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C. The FRCP 269 Conference, Mandatory Disclosure
and Court Orders Regarding Electronic Discovery
"[C]ounsel should take advantage of the required Rule 26(f)
meeting to discuss issues associated with electronic discovery."
59
The discovery rules mandate a conference between the parties to
prompt the settlement of discovery matters amongst themselves,
provide the standard relevant to a claim or defense as the baseline for
determining the scope of discovery, and require the parties'
submission of a discovery plan prior to the court issuing a scheduling
order. 60 As reflected in the proposed amendments to FRCP 26(f) and
58. See Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West)
828 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (granting the part of the plaintiffs motions for sanctions
that requested a jury instruction indicating that gaps in production of
documents are attributable to the defendant telecommunications company, and
fining the company's CEO where the defendants did not adequately discharge
the duty that arose on the date litigation commenced to preserve discoverable,
primarily electronic, documents due to a lack of decisive steps to adequately
implement the defendant company's internal document retention policy and the
defendants' lack of understanding of the uses, significance or method of
generation of its own documents, but denying the sanction of default
judgment); see also Metro. Opera Ass'n v. Local 100, Hotel Employees &
Rest. Employees Int'l Union, 212 F.R.D. 178, 190, 220-231 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(granting plaintiffs motion for liability against defendant among other
sanctions due to defendant's discovery abuses that included lack of electronic
document retention policy and a lack of understanding of automatic e-mail
deletion among other failures), adhered to by 00 Civ. 3613 (LAP), 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17093 (Aug. 27, 2004); infra Part VII; infra Part III.G.
59. In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D 437, 444 (D.N.J.
2002).
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f):
[Conference of Parties; Planning for Discovery.] Except in categories
of proceedings exempted from initial disclosure under Rule
26(a)(1)(E) or when otherwise ordered, the parties must, as soon as
practicable and in any event at least 21 days before a scheduling
conference is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b),
confer to consider the nature and basis of their claims and defenses
and the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the case,
to make or arrange for the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1), and
to develop a proposed discovery plan that indicates the parties' views
and proposals concerning:
(1) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or
requirement for disclosures under Rule 26(a), including a
statement as to when disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) were made
or will be made;
(2) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when
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the ABA discovery standards, the ideal contemporary discovery
conference includes a broad discussion of electronic discovery
issues, including preservation, strategies for determining the scope of
discovery, an attempt to make the scope of discovery determination,
and the form production will take.6 1 One court summarized the
discovery should be completed, and whether discovery should be
conducted in phases or be limited to or focused upon particular
issues;
(3) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery
imposed under these rules or by local rule, and what other
limitations should be imposed; and
(4) any other orders that should be entered by the court under Rule
26(c) or under Rule 16(b) and (c).
The attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties that have
appeared in the case are jointly responsible for arranging the
conference, for attempting in good faith to agree on the proposed
discovery plan, and for submitting to the court within 14 days after the
conference a written report outlining the plan. A court may order that
the parties or attorneys attend the conference in person. If necessary
to comply with its expedited schedule for Rule 16(b) conferences, a
court may by local rule (i) require that the conference between the
parties occur fewer than 21 days before the scheduling conference is
held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b), and (ii) require that
the written report outlining the discovery plan be filed fewer than 14
days after the conference between the parties, or excuse the parties
from submitting a written report and permit them to report orally on
their discovery plan at the Rule 16(b) conference.
61. See REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2,
at 6:
Under the proposed amendments to Rule 26(0, the parties are to
address during their conference any issues relating to the disclosure or
discovery of electronically stored information, including the form of
production, and also to discuss issues relating to the preservation of
electronically stored information .... The results of these discussions
are to be included, as appropriate, in the discovery plan presented to
the court.
AMENDMENTS TO ABA CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 12-13,
provides a more thorough best practices description of the matters counsel
ought to address in an electronic world:
[Standard] 31. Discovery Conferences.
a. At the initial discovery conference, the parties should confer about
any electronic discovery that they anticipate requesting from one
another, including:
i. The subject matter of such discovery.
ii. The time period with respect to which such discovery may be
sought.
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iii. Identification or description of the party-affiliated persons,
entities or groups from whom such discovery may be sought.
iv. Identification or description of those persons currently or
formerly affiliated with the prospective responding party who are
knowledgeable of the information systems, technology and
software necessary to access potentially responsive data.
v. The potentially responsive data that exist, including the
platforms on which, and places where, such data may be found as
set forth in Standard 29 (a).
vi. The accessibility of the potentially responsive data, including
discussion of software, hardware or other specialized equipment
that may be necessary to obtain access.
vii. Whether potentially responsive data exist in searchable form.
viii. Whether potentially responsive electronic data will be
requested and produced:
A. In electronic form or in hard copy, and
B. If in electronic form, the format in which the data exist or
will be produced
ix. Data retention policies applicable to potentially responsive
data.
x. Preservation of potentially responsive data, specifically
addressing (A) preservation of data generated subsequent to the
filing of the claim, (B) data otherwise customarily subject to
destruction in ordinary course, and (C) metadata reflecting the
creation, editing, transmittal, receipt or opening of responsive
data.
xi. The use of key terms or other selection criteria to search
potentially responsive data for discoverable information.
xii. The identity of unaffiliated information technology
consultants whom the litigants agree are capable of independently
extracting, searching or otherwise exploiting potentially
responsive data.
xiii. Stipulating to the entry of a court order providing that
production to other parties, or review by a mutually-agreed
independent information technology consultant, of attorney-client
privileged or attorney work-product protected electronic data will
not effect a waiver of privilege or work product protection.
xiv. The appropriateness of an inspection of computer systems,
software, or data to facilitate or focus the discovery of electronic
data.
xv. The allocation of costs.
b. At any discovery conference that concerns particular requests for
electronic discovery, in addition to conferring about the topics set
forth in subsection (a), the parties should consider, where appropriate,
stipulating to the entry of a court order providing for:
i. The initial production of tranches or subsets of potentially
responsive data to allow the parties to evaluate the likely benefit
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judiciary's preference to issue a discovery order that closely mirrors
an agreement worked out by the parties and that addresses electronic
discovery:
[Fed. R. Civ. P.] 26(f) provides that before a Rule 16
Conference, the parties "confer... to develop a proposed
discovery plan. . . ." In the electronic age, this meet and
confer should include a discussion on whether each side
possesses information in electronic form, whether they
intend to produce such material, whether each other's
software is compatible, whether there exists any privilege
issue requiring redaction, and how to allocate costs
involved with each of the foregoing .... Moreover, the
standard initial scheduling order in this District contains
instructions on topics to be discussed in the preparation of a
Joint Discovery Plan which include "(3) a description of all
discovery problems encountered to date, the efforts
undertaken by the parties to remedy these problems, and the
parties' suggested resolution of problems; (4) a description
of the parties' further discovery needs."
62
Indeed, the local rules of several districts direct the parties to
consider electronic discovery, 63 as do the Proposed Amendments to
of production of additional data, without prejudice to the
requesting party's right to insist later on more complete
production.
ii. The use of specified key terms or other selection criteria to
search some or all of the potentially responsive data for
discoverable information, in lieu of production.
iii. The appointment of a mutually-agreed, independent
information technology consultant pursuant to Standard 32(a) to:
A. Extract defined categories of potentially responsive data
from specified sources, or
B. Search or otherwise exploit potentially responsive data in
accordance with specific, mutually-agreed parameters.
62. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 205 F.R.D at 443-44.
63. DIST. N.J.R. 26.1.
(b)(2) The parties shall submit their Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) discovery
plan containing the parties' views and proposals regarding the
following:
[(b)(2)](d) Whether any party will likely request or produce computer-
based or other digital information, and if so, the parties' discussions of
the issues listed under the Duty to Meet and Confer in L. Civ. R.
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the Rules of Civil Procedure. 64 When the parties fail to reach an
agreement and submit a discovery plan with competing proposals for
electronic discovery, however, the court is left to resolve those
discovery problems and determine the practical scope of discovery.
65
1. Emergency Requests for Electronic Material
Sometimes a party will make an emergency request, after
discovery has begun, for a preservation order or motion to
26.1 (d)(3) below;
[(b)(2)](g) Any orders, such as data preservation orders, protective
orders, etc., which should be entered;
(d) Discovery of Digital Information Including Computer-Based
Information;
[(d)](3) Duty to Meet and Confer. During the Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)
conference, the parties shall confer and attempt to agree on computer-
based and other digital discovery matters, including the following:
[(3)](a) Preservation and production of digital information; procedures
to deal with inadvertent production of privilged information; whether
restoration of deleted digital information may be necessary; whether
back up or historic legacy data is within the scope of discovery; and
the media, format, and procedures for producing digital information;
[(3)](b) Who will bear the costs of preservation, production, and
restoration (if necessary) of any digital discovery.
See also E. DIST. & W. DIST. ARK. R. 26.1(4); DIST. WYO. LOCAL Civ. R.
26.1 (d)(3)(B).
64. REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITrEE supra note 2, app.
8-9 (proposed amendment to Rule 26(f)):
the parties must... confer.., to discuss any issues relating to
preserving discoverable information, and to develop a proposed
discovery plan that indicates the parties' views and proposals
concerning:
(3) any issues relating to disclosure or discovery of electronically
stored information, including the form in which it should be produced
(proposed amendments italicized).
65. See id. at 1-2 (FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) "[Scheduling and Planning]....
The [court-entered] scheduling order may also include (4) modifications of the
times for disclosures under Rules 26(a) and 26(e)(1) and of the extent of
discovery to be permitted; (5) provisions for disclosure or discovery of
electronically stored information. " (proposed amendment italicized)).
66. In Capricorn Power Co. v. Siemens Westinghouse Power Corp., 220
F.R.D. 429, 430-31 (W.D. Pa. 2004), both the defendant and the plaintiff filed
1607
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1591
compel.67 For instance, a plaintiff may be "dissatisfied with the
results of the discovery process and suspect[] that [the] defendants
possess more information than they have produced. ' '6 As with such
motions prior to the discovery conference, the requesting party must
have some specific rationale to warrant the intrusion 69 and
demonstrate some level of sophistication in regards to information
systems.7 °
motions for the preservation of "Documents, Software and Things" after a
mistrial. The court devised its own test to determine whether a preservation
order was warranted:
An evaluation of a motion for a preservation order therefore demands
application of a separate and distinct test, which can be formulated by
molding the factors used in granting injunctive relief with the
considerations, policies and goals applicable to discovery.... [T]his
Court believes that a balancing test which considers the following
three factors should be used when deciding a motion to preserve
documents, things and land: 1) the level of concern the court has for
the continuing existence and maintenance of the integrity of the
evidence in question in the absence of an order directing preservation
of the evidence; 2) any irreparable harm likely to result to the party
seeking the preservation of evidence absent an order directing
preservation; and 3) the capability of an individual, entity, or party to
maintain the evidence sought to be preserved, not only as to the
evidence's original form, condition or contents, but also the physical,
spatial and financial burdens created by ordering evidence
preservation.
Id. at 433-34 (footnote omitted).
67. Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 644, 645, 651
(S.D. Ind. 2000).
68. Bethea v. Comcast, 218 F.R.D. 328, 329 (D.D.C. 2003).
69. See Simon Prop. Group, 194 F.R.D. at 651:
In separate rulings on plaintiff's initial motion to compel, the court has
established an inspection process for the hard drives and other
memories of computers used by mySimon and its senior leaders. That
process will culminate in defendant supplementing its document
production. The court expects that process to address sufficiently the
issues raised [in this emergency motion to compel] with respect to
electronic mail discovery. To the extent plaintiff seeks additional
relief on this topic, that request is denied.
70. See Bethea, 218 F.R.D. at 330:
[P]laintiff seeks to enter defendants' premises and inspect their
computer systems merely because they are "believed to contain
appropriate discovery information."... [P]laintiff is speculating, and
such conjecture does not warrant the compelled inspection of a
computer system that contains voluminous information relating to
many topics other than plaintiff's employment discrimination claim.
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2. Scope of Tier One Discoverable Electronic Documents
"Electronic documents are no less subject to disclosure than
paper records." 71 Though broad, the traditional mandatory disclosure
requirement of tier one discovery does not mean that any paper
document ever written by a party must be disclosed.72 Thus,
electronic discovery within tier one cannot be boundless either.
73
The courts are attempting to define what the scope of tier one
electronic discovery should be, sometimes dealing with
misconceptions about the ease of searching a party's entire
information systems network and the nature of discovering material
in legacy systems. 74  Here, too, requests for discovery should be
made with some specificity that indicates an understanding of
computer systems.75 Similarly, the responding party's understanding
In addition, plaintiff has made no showing that the documents she
seeks actually exist or that the defendants have unlawfully failed to
produce them. Indeed, plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants
failed to make a search of adequate scope or duration.
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
71. Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,
428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
72. Cf 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.41
(3d ed. 2004) (noting that the amendments to FRCP 26(b) in 2000 created a
two-tiered system of discovery, where the "relevant to the claim or defense"
standard for determining the scope of the first tier of discovery is narrower
than the "subject matter involved in the action" standard that was used to
determine the sole scope of discovery prior to the amendments).
73. See Thompson v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219
F.R.D. 93, 97 (D. Md. 2003):
[G]iven the minimal threshold requirements of Rule 26(b)(1) for the
discoverability of information (a requesting party is entitled to seek
discovery of non-privileged information "relevant" to the claims and
defenses raised in the pleadings), and the potentially enormous task of
searching for all relevant and unprivileged electronic records, courts
have attempted to fashion reasonable limits that will serve the
legitimate needs of the requesting party for information, without unfair
burden or expense to the producing party.
74. Cf REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2,
at 10-11 ("[T]he proposed amendment [to Rule 26(b)(2)] is required because
of the staggering volume of electronically stored information and because of
the variety of ways in which such information is maintained.").
75. Cf DIST. WYO. R. 26.1(d)(3)(A) ("Duty to Notify. A party seeking
discovery of computer-based information shall notify the opposing party
immediately, but no later than the Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) conference of that fact
and identify as clearly as possible the categories of information which may be
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of its information systems, document retention policy and the
specificity of its objection to discovery of electronic documents can
impact the court's ruling.
76
a. Defining the boundaries of users from
whom discovery may be had
Just as a party cannot discover the materials contained in every
paper filing cabinet in its adversary's far flung network of offices,
the scope of discovery of electronic documents must be limited to
those generated by people relevant to the requesting party's claim or
defense in a tier one analysis.77 One court applied
sought.").
76. See Rowe Entm 't, 205 F.R.D. at 428:
[T]he defendants' claims that the e-mail is unlikely to yield relevant
information [is un]persuasive. General representations by WMA and
Monterey that their employees do little business by e-mail are
undocumented and are contradicted by data proffered by these same
defendants. Monterey, for example, estimates that its eight computers
contain 198,000 e-mail messages .... It is probable that some
significant portion of this traffic related to the conduct of business.
Furthermore, the supposition that important e-mails have been printed
in hard copy form is likewise unsupported. In general, nearly one-third
of all electronically stored data is never printed out.... Here, the
defendants have not alleged that they had any corporate policy
defining which e-mail messages should be reduced to hard copy
because they are "important."
77. See Tulip Computers Int'l v. Dell Computer Corp., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(West) 1420, 1429 & n.2 (D. Del. 2002) (finding that the plaintiff s attempts to
link Michael Dell to involvement in alleged patent infringement was too
tenuous to allow broad discovery of Michael Dell's e-mail, while granting
access to search other Dell executives' e-mails for responsive documents); cf
Jones v. Goord, No. 95 CIV.8026(GEL), 2002 WL 1007614, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
May 16, 2002).
The [defendant] State, indeed, does not directly challenge the claim
that the [electronic] material sought is relevant [to the plaintiffs
claim], within the meaning of Rule 26(b)(1). At the same time, it is
far from clear from the evidence presented that all of the information
in the databases sought goes to these issues. Plaintiffs have not
established that the databases are limited to class [action] members, or
that they are or could be (without enormous effort and expense)
redacted to relate only to maximum-security inmates. So far as the
record before the Court indicates, in fact, the opposite is true. That is,
the databases appear to be general DOCS managerial tools, covering
all inmates in the State correctional system. Nothing in the record
suggests that the databases are easily broken down in such a way that
1610
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[T]he common sense principle that people generate data
referring to an event, whether e-mail or word processing
documents, contemporaneous with that event ....
Conversely, it is unlikely that people, working in an office,
generate data about an event that is not contemporaneous
unless they have been charged with the responsibility to
investigate that event or to create some form of history
about it.
78
Careful use of this temporal-individual principle of relevancy
can establish a spectrum of users "more likely than not" to have
generated electronic documents relevant to a claim or defense within
a discrete period of time.79 Another court, speaking in the context of
the duty to preserve electronic records during a litigation hold, used
the colloquial term "key players" to define the basic scope of the
defendant's employees whose electronic documents would likely be
discoverable.
80
The informal nature of certain electronic documents, such as
e-mail, can also lead to special privacy concerns. 81 That is, while an
employee might not include personal information in a more formal
paper document on a relevant matter, the character of e-mail is such
that an employee may mix personal and business matters in
electronic messages. 82  One court had little sympathy for such
only the portion relating to the institutions involved in this lawsuit can
be separately reproduced or disclosed.
Id In Kormendi v. Computer Associates International the court suggests that
the plaintiff may propose discovery from employees of the defendant who
might have saved e-mails relevant to the plaintiff's termination in addition to
those employees the defendant has identified as involved in the termination,
but that the plaintiff "has little incentive to demand expensive searches, since
plaintiff must pay the cost of the e-mail search." No. 02Civ.2996(LAK)(DFE),
2002 WL 31385832, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2002).
78. McPeek v. Ashcroft, 212 F.R.D. 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2003).
79. Id. at 35-37.
80. Thompson v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D.
93, 100 (D. Md. 2003).
81. See REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY CoMMITTEE, supra note 2,
at app. 20 ("The volume of [electronic] data, and the informality that attends
use of e-mail and some other types of electronically stored information, may
make privilege determinations more difficult, and privilege review
correspondingly more expensive and time consuming.").
82. Cf Byers v. Ill. State Police, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 740, 754 (N.D.
11. 2002).
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personal privacy concerns: "To the degree the defendants seek to
assert the privacy concerns of their employees, those interests are
severely limited .... [A]n employee who uses his or her employer's
computer for personal communications assumes some risk that they
will be accessed by the employer or by others." 83 Thus, while some
courts may consider personal privacy concerns, the normal privilege
and privacy concerns of discovery are paramount in the electronic
discovery arena.
84
b. Determining what documents may be discovered
as relevant to a claim or defense
"American lawyers engaged in discovery have never been
accused of asking for too little .... [L]ike the Rolling Stones, they
hope that if they ask for what they want, they will get what they
need. They hardly need... encouragement to demand as much as
they can from their opponent."8 5 Where the parties cannot agree at
the 26(f) conference whether and where discoverable documents
exist or objections are lodged during discovery, the court may
attempt to rule on a discovery request under tier one's relevance to a
claim or defense scope standard. "Using traditional search methods
to locate paper records in a digital world presents unique problems"
87
that courts must address.
[T]he Court is not persuaded by the plaintiffs' attempt to equate
traditional paper-based discovery with the discovery of e-mail
files.... E-mails have replaced other forms of communication
besides just paper-based communication. Many informal messages
that were previously relayed by telephone or at the water cooler are
now sent via e-mail.... All of these e-mails must be scanned for both
relevance and privilege.
Id. (citation omitted).
83. Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,
428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
84. See infra Part V. for more on privilege and privacy.
85. McPeek v. Ashcrott, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2001).
86. See id. (analyzing the plaintiffs motion to compel discovery of
electronic documents from backup systems under the relevant to a claim or
defense standard).
87. Id. at 32.
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i. Determining whether documents subject to
mandatory disclosure exist
Where the parties cannot come to an agreement on the scope of
discovery at the 26(f) conference or where discovery within tier one
does not proceed smoothly, courts determine the appropriate scope of
mandatory disclosure consistent with their power to compel
discovery. 88 There is some onus on the party requesting production
not to make an overbroad request from the start.89  Also, in the
extremely large universe of electronic documents, the party asked to
make the disclosures may not have a strong enough grasp on its
information system(s) to be able to pinpoint the location of
discoverable documents, or even to know for certain if discoverable
documents exist.
90
Matters of privilege and confidentiality are also implicated
where the court orders untargeted or sample access to electronic
documents in order to determine if discoverable documents exist.
9'
Therefore, a court may order the parties to try again to work out the
scope of discovery between them.
92
88. See In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2003)
(stating that a district court has the power to make the producing party comply
with mandatory disclosure under the tier one, relevant to a claim or defense
standard, as long as it gives some explanation for its ruling).
89. Cf id. at 1317 (granting defendant car manufacturer's petition for writ
of mandamus by finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to a broad order
from the district court granting direct access to Ford's customer, dealer and
employee contacts databases absent "a factual finding of some non-compliance
with discovery rules by Ford").
90. See McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 31.
91. See FordMotor, 345 F.3d at 1317:
[T]he district court granted [the plaintiff] unlimited, direct access to
[the defendant]'s databases. The district court established no protocols
for the search. The court did not even designate search terms to restrict
the search. Without constraints, the order grants [the plaintiff] access
to information that would not-and should not--otherwise be
discoverable without [the defendant] first having had an opportunity to
object.
92. See In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., 98 Civ. 7161
(VM)(DFE), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26446, at *9-*10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2003)
(ordering, in response to the plaintiffs' request for additional electronic
discovery, the defendant to explain to the plaintiff "all the steps it has taken to
find responsive e-mails. As to any further steps... [the defendant] and
plaintiffs should confer .... If they are unable to reach a resolution, they
should send me a single joint letter .... "). In Gambale v. Deutsche Bank Ag,
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Finally, a court may employ a variety of strategies to help it
reach an informed decision on the scope of discovery:
Under Rules 26(b)(2) and 26(c), a court is provided
abundant resources to tailor discovery requests to avoid
unfair burden or expense and yet assure fair disclosure of
important information. The options available are limited
only by the court's own imagination and the quality and
quantity of the factual information provided by the parties
to be used by the court in evaluating the Rule 26(b)(2)
factors. The court can, for example, shift the cost, in whole
or part, of burdensome and expensive Rule 34 discovery to
the requesting party; it can limit the number of hours
required by the producing party to search for electronic
records; or it can restrict the sources that must be checked.
It can delay production of electronic records in response to
a Rule 34 request until after the deposition of information
and technology personnel of the producing party, who can
testify in detail as to the systems in place, as well as to the
storage and retention of electronic records, enabling more
focused and less costly discovery. A court also can require
the parties to identify experts to assist in structuring a
search for existing and deleted electronic data and retain
such an expert on behalf of the court. But it can do none of
these things in a factual vacuum, and ipse dixit assertions
by counsel that requested discovery of electronic records is
overbroad, burdensome or prohibitively expensive provide
no help at all to the court.
93
the court ordered the defendant to submit an affidavit detailing the steps
already taken to search electronic files in response to certain discovery requests
and explain the "feasibility and cost of retrieving [responsive] e-mails." No.
02 Civ.4791 HB DFE, 2002 WL 31655326, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2002).
The plaintiff would then have to either submit to a cost-shifting analysis and
protocol to obtain discovery or "argue for a different protocol by conferring
with [the defendant] and sending [the judge] a single joint letter outlining the
parties' positions on this issue." Id.
93. Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98-99
(D. Md. 2003). For more on cost shifting see infra Parts III.D.2 & IV. For
more on application of the FRCP 26(b)(2) factors to determine the scope of
discovery, see infra Part III.D. 1.
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(a) Overbroad requests
A common objection raised by the responding party to
electronic discovery requests is that the request is too broad. 94 Just
as a litigant would not ask the opposition to search its trash bins for
all garbage thrown out over the past ten years in the course of
traditional discovery, a party that moves for electronic discovery
must put some thought into the breadth of the electronic production it
has requested.95 Electronic discovery requests based on speculation
are likely to be denied.96 Similarly, vague assertions by the
94. See In re Amsted Indus., Inc. "ERISA" Litig., No. 01 C 2963 2002 WL
31844956, at *1-*2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2002).
The parties dispute whether plaintiffs' requests for documents
conform to the parameters of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26,
which provides that a party may request production of any non-
privileged documents regarding any matter that is relevant to the claim
or defense of any party....
Defendants assert that producing the requested documents, without
limitations, will lead to the production of irrelevant material that had
no bearing on the decisions [to take certain actions that the plaintiff
asserts breached the defendant's fiduciary duties]....
To the extent that defendants' e-mail investigation was limited by their
relevancy objections, they should now [conduct a broader search for
discovery of electronic data].
Id.(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
95. See Wright v. AmSouth Bancorporation, 320 F.3d 1198, 1205 (11th
Cir. 2003).
[The plaintiff] sought discovery of a "computer diskette or tape copy
of all word processing files created, modified and/or accessed by, or
on behalf' of five [of the defendant's] employees over a two and one-
half year period. [The plaintiff] made no attempt to narrow his request
to something more meaningful and relevant during the discovery
period despite an appropriate objection from [the defendant]. The
district court denied [the plaintiff]'s motion to compel these items as
being overly broad and unduly burdensome. The court also found that
[the plaintiff] failed to make a "reasonable showing of relevance" for
these items....
This Court has written that discovery in Title VII cases is "not without
limits. The information sought must be relevant and not overly
burdensome to the responding party." On appeal, [the plaintiff] has
not tried to identify particular items within the expansive request nor
has he provided a theory of relevance that might narrow the scope of
his request. The district court abused no discretion in its ruling on the
discovery issue.
Id. (citation omitted).
96. See Stallings-Daniel v. N. Trust Co., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1406,
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responding party that electronic discovery requests should be denied
as overbroad are not likely to be successful.97
The court may also take into account whether all parties to the
litigation tried to come to a reasonable agreement as to the scope of
electronic discovery between themselves.
98
(b) Sampling
The court may order that some small percentage of documents
from the producing party's information system(s) be produced. 99
1407-08 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
Plaintiff wishes to have us review the discovery history of a settled
case that was before a different judge and hold that because defendant
may have committed some sort of discovery abuse there, it must also
be guilty of similar conduct here, justifying electronic discovery for
documents she is not sure even exist....
Nothing in the documents produced justifies an intrusive and wholly
speculative electronic investigation into defendant's e-mail files.
Id. (footnote omitted).
97. Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 98:
[T]he most important ingredient for the analytical process to produce a
fair result is a particularization of the facts to support any challenge to
discovery of electronic records. Conclusory or factually unsupported
assertions by counsel that the discovery of electronic materials should
be denied because of burden or expense can be expected to fail.
98. Cf Super Film of Am., Inc. v. UCB Films, Inc. 219 F.R.D. 649, 656-
57 (D. Kan. 2004) (rejecting the responding party's contention that a discovery
request was overly burdensome where the requesting party "ha[d] attempted to
reach a stipulation regarding the scope of the parties' obligations to produce
electronic discovery").
99. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y.
May 13, 2003) ("Requiring the responding party to restore and produce
responsive documents from a small sample of the requested backup tapes is a
sensible approach in most cases."); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34-35
(D.D.C. 2001).
I have decided to take small steps and perform, as it were, a test run.
Accordingly, I will order DOJ to perform a backup restoration of the
e-mails attributable to Diegelman's computer during the period of July
1, 1998 to July 1, 1999. I have chosen this period because a letter
from plaintiffs counsel to DOJ, complaining of retaliation and
threatening to file an administrative claim, is dated July 2, 1998, and it
seems to me a convenient and rational starting point to search for
evidence of retaliation. I have chosen e-mail because of its universal
use and because I am hoping that the restoration will yield both the e-
mails Diegelman sent and those he received.
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These documents are analyzed to determine if they contain
discoverable material. 00 The court can then make its final order
based on the results of this analysis, taking into account the effort
and expense involved in the search in relation to the discoverable
documents, if any, uncovered.' 0 '
(c) Specialized searching
Where technically feasible, courts may only require the
responding party to search its information systems for discoverable
material by key term or other such controlled method.1
0 2
Id.
100. McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 35 (ordering the defendant "to search in the
[sample of] restored e-mails for any document responsive to any of plaintiffs
requests for production of documents"); see also Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 324
(ordering the defendant to "prepare an affidavit detailing the results of its
search [once completed], as well as the time and money spent").
101. See Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 324 ("When based on an actual sample, the
marginal utility test will not be an exercise in speculation-there will be
tangible evidence of what the backup tapes may have to offer. There will also
be tangible evidence of the time and cost required to restore the backup tapes,"
all of which will inform the court's application of the marginal utility test to
determine whether to grant plaintiffs request for discovery of electronic
documents); see also McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 35 (requiring the defendant, once
it has finished searching the sample for responsive documents, to "file a
comprehensive, sworn certification of the time and money spent and the results
of the search. Once it does, [the magistrate judge] will permit the parties an
opportunity to argue why the results and the expense do or do not justify any
further search.").
102. See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 212 F.R.D. 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2001) ("The
backup tape... is close enough in time to warrant a search of it with the
understanding that the defendant need only search it for references to
plaintiff's intention to file suit or to any aspect of Diegelman's activities in
reference to JPR in the month of January, 2000."); Tulip Computers Int'l v.
Dell Computers Corp., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1420, 1429 (D. Del. 2002)
(ordering search of Dell executives' e-mails "based on an agreed upon list of
search terms"). In Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, the court
did not require the producing party to conduct key word searches, holding that
the producing party met its burden of production by providing the requesting
party with CD-ROMS containing potentially responsive e-mails of which the
requesting party could conduct text searches. No. 03 Civ. 0257(RWS), 2004
WL 764895, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2004). In Medtronic SofamorDanek, Inc.
v. Michelson, the special master was ordered to conduct keyword searches
based on a list submitted by the requesting party. 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West)
1159, 1171 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). But see In re Amsted Indus., Inc. "ERISA"
Litig., No. 01 C 2963, 2002 WL 31844956, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2002)
(ordering the defendant, which had conducted word searches of backup tapes
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(d) Use of a special master
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow judges to appoint
special masters to perform certain duties by consent of the parties or
under exceptional circumstances where cases present complicated
issues that warrant such an appointment.103 Thus, courts have
appointed a disinterested third party to conduct forensic inspections
to determine whether potentially discoverable documents exist in the
responding party's information systems, which helps address the
responding party's concerns about privilege, privacy, and waiver of
privilege. 10 4 See infra Part V for more on privilege and privacy.
(e) Sneak peak/clawback
The Court may allow the requesting party to have a "sneak
peak" at some of the types of documents it has requested to
determine if discoverable material is available.' 0 5 In such cases, the
to find documents relevant to the claims in the case, to research tapes and e-
mail folders of relevant parties more thoroughly).
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a).
104. Medtronic, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 1171.
Given the amount of electronic data at issue, the court finds that the
appointment of a special master to oversee discovery is warranted and
that the special master should be a technology or computer expert.
The special master's duties will include making decisions with regard
to search terms; overseeing the design of searches and the scheduling
of searches and production; coordinating deliveries between the
parties and their vendors; and advising both parties, at either's request,
on cost estimates and technical issues. The special master shall be
subject to all confidentiality requirements and protective orders set
forth in this and in other orders in this cause [sic].
Id.; see also Tulip Computers, 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 1424-25 (ordering
the defendant to produce e-mails a consultant deemed discoverable "subject to
[the plaintiff's] review for privilege and confidentiality designations provided
under the protective order"); cf First USA Bank v. PayPal, Inc., 76 Fed. Appx.
935, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting appeal of former CEO of defendant from
magistrate judge's order "allow[ing] electronic discovery consultants to create
a forensic copy of the [former CEO's] computer's hard drive and identify any
potentially relevant documents and, if such documents were found and
identified,.. . allow[ing the former CEO] to create a privilege log"); McCurdy
Group v. Am. Biomed. Group, 9 Fed. Appx. 822, 831 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[The
defendant] has not explained why inspection of the [plaintiffs] zip drive
and/or inspection of the hard drive by [a third party] would not have been
sufficient to satisfy its concerns [about the plaintiffs full compliance with
discovery].").
105. See REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITrEE, supra note 2,
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court usually makes special provisions for privilege claims, return of
privileged documents, and non-waiver of privilege.1
0 6
ii. Producing documents that are not reasonably accessible
"[T]he obligations of a responding party to provide discovery of
electronically stored information that is not reasonably accessible [is]
an increasingly disputed aspect of such discovery."' 1 7 Reasonably
accessible electronic information is "information that the party itself
routinely accesses or uses or that is easily located and retrieved."'
10 8
Advances in information technology, as well as business reasons for
storing copies of data electronically for recovery in case of system
failure has led to categories of electronic data that are considered not
reasonably accessible, but that do exist and are sought. 109
A discussion of how some courts analyze requests for electronic
documents that are difficult to retrieve under tier one of discovery
follows below. It is first noted, however, that a proposed amendment
to FRCP 26(b)(2) acknowledges the difficulties inherent in
producing documents that are not reasonably accessible by removing
discovery of such electronic material from tier one altogether into
tier two of discovery, which would give litigants and courts greater
guidance in how to approach discovery of such information."
0
at 8-9 ("Parties frequently attempt to minimize the cost and delay of an
exhaustive privilege review by agreeing to protocols that minimize the risk of
waiver. Such protocols may include so-called quick peek or claw back
arrangements, which allow production without a complete prior privilege
review .... ).
106. Cf REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMrrEE, supra note 2,
at 3-4 (The parties may agree to, and the court may enter a case-management
order where, "requested materials [are provided] without waiver of privilege to
enable the party seeking production to designate the materials desired for
actual production, with the privilege review of only those materials to
follow."); see infra Part V. for more on privilege and privacy.
107. REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITrEE, supra note 2, at
10.
108. Id. at 11.
109. Id. at 10-11.
110. The REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2,
at 6, adds the following language to the end of FRCP 26(b)(2):
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible. On
motion by the requesting party, the responding party must show that
the information is not reasonably accessible. If that showing is made,
the court may order discovery of the information for good cause and
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(a) Legacy data
"Legacy data is stored information that is no longer used and
only maintained on an obsolete system, making it expensive and
burdensome to restore and provide.""' While it is reasonable to
produce documents that are routinely accessed from current systems,
data in legacy systems, including backup tapes, may not be
reasonably accessible. 1 2 A cautious approach to ordering restorationof legacy data is indicated." 3
(b) Information on backup systems
Most businesses (and even individuals) back up their
information for disaster recovery in case of catastrophic failure."1
4
"Backup tapes are by their nature indiscriminate. They capture all
information at a given time and from a given server but do not
catalogue it by subject matter. Unlike a labeled file cabinet or paper
files organized under an index, the collection of data... [can be]
random.""11 5 There appears to be "no controlling authority for the
proposition that restoring all backup tapes is necessary in every case.
may specify terms and conditions for such discovery.
111. REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at
11.
112. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(West) 1159, 1160 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) ("[D]ata on each backup tape must be
restored from the backup tape format to a format that a standard computer can
read."). In McPeek v. Ashcroft, the court appeared to accept the defendant's
assertion that
for the period 1992-1998, the DOJ computer system was known as
"Eagle." In 1998, DOJ computers were briefly connected to a system
called "JCON 1." From 1998 to the present, they have been connected
to "JCON2."... [Thus] the backup tapes have to be "restored" or
rendered readable by returning the files to a source (i.e., a disk or hard
drive) from which they can be read by the application which originally
created them.
202 F.R.D. 31, 32 (D.D.C. 2001) (citations omitted).
113. See McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34 (ordering a sample restoration of e-mails
from backup tapes covering a discrete time period).
114. See, e.g., id. at 33 ("[T]he [backup] system was designed to prevent
disaster, i.e., the destruction of all the data being produced on a given day if the
network system crashed. Once the day ended and the system had not crashed,
the system administrator could breathe a sigh of relief.").
115. Id.; see also REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
supra note 2, at 11 ("[I]nformation stored only for disaster recovery is
generally expensive to restore and is disorganized.").
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require such a search,
and the handful of cases are idiosyncratic ... .,, 16 Consequently,
some courts find circumstances where it is reasonable-and develop
strategies to help make it reasonable-to require a party to produce
documents from backup systems despite the uncertainties, difficulties
and expense involved. 1 7 Other courts, however, do not find any
circumstances which warrant the search of backup systems. "1
8
(c) Deleted data
"'[D]eleting' electronic records does not actually result in their
instantaneous erasure, but rather simply designates [a] file as 'not
used,' thereby enabling the computer to write over it .... [R]equests
seeking 'deleted' electronic records are permissible."' 19 The simple
116. McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 33.
117. See id. at 33-35 (balancing the likelihood of finding information
relevant to a claim or defense with the expense involved in deciding whether to
compel a search of backup tapes and order a sample restoration of e-mails from
backup tapes covering a discrete time period); see also Zhou v. Pittsburg State
Univ., No. 01-2493-KHV, 2003 WL 1905988, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 5, 2003)
(reading FRCP 26(b) in conjunction with FRCP 34, the court found that
"[s]imply put, the disclosing party must take reasonable steps to ensure that it
discloses any back-up copies of files or archival tapes that will provide
information about any 'deleted' electronic data"). In Medtronic, the court
ordered backup tapes that both parties conceded would contain relevant
electronic data to be searched by a special master, but also ordered that the
requesting party share in the cost of production. 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at
1161, 1170-77.
118. After the restoration of sample backup tapes ordered in 2001 in
McPeek, 202 F.R.D at 33-35, was completed, the plaintiff returned to court to
request that Magistrate Judge Facciola order further searches of the
defendant's backup tapes. McPeek v. Ashcroft, 212 F.R.D. 33, 34 (D.D.C.
2003). In the subsequent proceeding, Judge Facciola applied a "more likely
than not" to contain relevant information standard to sixteen additional backup
tapes the plaintiff wished to have searched. Id. at 34-37. Judge Facciola
found that fifteen of the sixteen backup tapes were unlikely to yield electronic
documents relevant to the plaintiff's lawsuit, and thus did not require the
defendant to search those tapes. Id.
119. Thompson v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D.
93, 97 (D. Md. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Zhou v. Pittsburg State
Univ., No. 01-2493-KHV, 2003 WL 1905988, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 5, 2003)
(reading FRCP 26(b) in conjunction with FRCP 34, the court found that
"[s]imply put, the disclosing party must take reasonable steps to ensure that it
discloses any back-up copies of files or archival tapes that will provide
information about any 'deleted' electronic data."); Computer Assoc. Int'l v.
Quest Software, Inc., 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 401, 402 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
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act of booting up a computer or saving a new document may,
however, lead to the deletion of electronic data, with no intent to
spoliate. 120 Thus, a court may order the production of a sample of
material from backup tapes so that the relevance of deleted electronic
data, if any, can be assessed. 12 1 The proposed amendments to FRCP
26(b)(2) would not require tier one (mandatory) disclosure of
documents that were deleted in the ordinary course of business.122
D. Tier Two Discovery: Broadening the Scope of
Discoverable Electronic Documents
The revisions to FRCP 26 made in 2000 mandated disclosure of
documents that meet the standard of being relevant to the claim or
defense, and also provided a second tier of discovery that allows the
pre-revision scope of discovery to be reached. 123 In tier two, the
requesting party may obtain a court order authorizing the application
of a broader standard of discovery to the subject matter involved in
the action with a showing of good cause. 124  "The dividing line
(requiring the defendant to bear the full cost of production of copies of hard
drives created by a third party that "[would] allow plaintiffs to search for and
reconstruct files that have been deleted from the [defendant's] computers and
would be otherwise undiscoverable" as the files would likely be relevant to the
plaintiff's trade secret misappropriation claim).
120. See REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2,
at 7 ("The ordinary operation of computers involves both the automatic
creation and the automatic deletion or overwriting of certain information.").
121. McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 33 ("There is a theoretical possibility that there
may be something on the tapes that is relevant to a claim or defense, for
example, a subsequently deleted e-mail that might be evidence of a retaliatory
motive," thus ordering a sample restoration of e-mails from backup tapes).
122. See REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2,
at 11 ("Deleted data may also be considered inaccessible if, despite the
possibility of restoration through forensic techniques, significant cost, effort,
and burden is required."); see also infra Part VII. for more on spoliation.
123. 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 72, § 26.41 (noting that the amendments to
FRCP 26(b) in 2000 created a two-tiered system of discovery, where the
second tier used the same "subject matter involved in the action" language that
was used to determine the standard for the sole scope of discovery prior to the
amendments).
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1):
For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant
to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need
not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All
1622
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between information relevant to the claims and defenses and that
relevant only to the subject matter of the action cannot be defined
with precision."' 25 Generally, the broader standard may be thought
of as allowing discovery of relevant information not admissible into
evidence, but reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. 126  In keeping with the language of Rule
26(b)(1) as revised in 2000, courts should apply the tests in 26(b)(2)
to determine whether to allow broader discovery. 12 7 The proposed
amendments to FRCP 26 attempt to clarify the distinction between
the two tiers of discovery within the electronic arena as well as to
provide procedural guidance to litigants and courts:
The proposed addition to Rule 26(b)(2) builds on the two-
tier structure of scope of discovery defined in Rule 26(b)(1)
and applies the structure to the burden of discovery into
electronically stored information. A party must provide
discovery of relevant reasonably accessible electronically
stored information without a court order. A party need not
review or provide discovery of electronically stored
information that it identifies as not reasonably accessible. If
the requesting party moves for discovery of such
information-the second tier-the responding party must
show that the information sought is not reasonably
accessible. If that showing is made, the court may order the
party to provide the information, but the order must be
discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i),
(ii), and (iii).
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee note, 192 F.R.D. 340, 389
(2000); see also Thompson v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 199
F.R.D. 168, 172 (D. Md. 2001) ("[T]he philosophical exercise of debating the
difference between discovery relevant to the 'claims and defenses' as opposed
to the 'subject matter' of the pending action [is] the juridical equivalent to
debating the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin....").
126. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee note, 192 F.R.D. 340,
389-390 (2000) ("The good-cause standard warranting broader discovery is
meant to be flexible.... [I]nformation must be relevant to be discoverable,
even though inadmissible, and... discovery of such material is permitted if
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.").
127. See id. at 390 ("[A] sentence has been added calling attention to the
limitations of subdivisions (b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). These limitations apply to
discovery that is otherwise within the scope of subdivision (b)(1). The
Committee has been told repeatedly that courts have not implemented these
limitations with the vigor that was contemplated.").
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based on a showing of good cause by the requesting party.
The good-cause analysis balances the requesting party's
need for the information against the burden on the
responding party. Courts addressing such concerns have
properly referred to the limitations in Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii),
and (iii)-whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit taking into account
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in
the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery
in resolving the issues-in deciding when and whether the
effort involved in obtaining such information is warranted.
The rule makes it clear that the producing party has the
burden of demonstrating that the requested electronically
stored information is inaccessible and that the requesting
party has the burden of demonstrating good cause for the
production of inaccessible information. 128
1. The Good Cause Analysis
FRCP 26(b)(2) provides courts with a rubric for balancing the
needs of the requesting party for additional discovery against the
burden to the responding party: 1
29
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods
otherwise permitted under these rules and by any local rule
shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the
128. REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at
11-12. For a discussion about the definition of information that is not
reasonably accessible, see supra Part III.C.2.b.ii.; see also Kleiner v. Bums, 48
Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 644, 649 (D. Kan. 2000) (pre-2000 amendment to
FRCP 26) ("The disclosing party shall take reasonable steps to ensure that it
discloses any back-up copies of files or archival tapes that will provide
information about any 'deleted' electronic data.").
129. In Thompson v. United States Department of Housing & Urban
Development, the court reviewed its reasons for holding in prior proceedings
that requested electronic documents were discoverable (though apparently
under a tier one standard). 219 F.R.D. 93, 96-99 (D. Md. 2003). The court
opined that it "can be argued with some force that the Rule 26(b)(2) balancing
factors are all that is needed to allow a court to reach a fair result when
considering the scope of discovery of electronic records." Id. at 98. See also
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee's discussion of the proposed addition to
Rule 26(b)(2) supra in the text accompanying note 110.
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discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,
or is obtainable from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the
party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of
the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources,
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and
the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the
issues. The court may act upon its own initiative after
reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Rule
26(c).
130
a. Duplicative or obtainable from some other source
Where the requesting party has received much of the
information requested in a traditional form, some showing of the
likely additional benefit of also receiving the data in electronic form
must be made by the requesting party. 131 For instance, in denying a
motion to compel discovery of computer-generated documents and
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
131. Jones v. Goord, No. 95 CIV.8026(GEL), 2002 WL 1007614, at *13-
*14 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2002).
Though plaintiffs do not need to show that obtaining this data will in
fact advance their cause, they do have to provide some basis to believe
that specific tests can be run that, with a reasonable degree of
scientific certainty, can be expected to yield results that would be
relevant to the issues before the Court.
[M]uch of the actual data in the databases (to the extent
relevant) has already been provided to plaintiffs in documentary form.
Plaintiffs cite no concrete facts available in the database, relevant to
the litigation, and unprivileged, that are not available in the 700,000
pages of material already provided to them.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Nicholas v. Wyndlam Int'l, Inc., 373 F.3d 537,
543 (4th Cir. 2004) (upholding the district court's denial of the defendant's
request for discovery of e-mails from a non-party owned by the plaintiffs as
duplicative where the "[p]laintiff s had already produced some 400 pages of e-
mails (including e-mails from their [non-party] accounts)"). The appeals court
also upheld the district court's entry of a FRCP 26(c) protective order that
discovery could not be had from the non-party because the defendant's
discovery request was also "unduly burdensome, and harassing." Id.
1625
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1591
e-mail without prejudice, one court showed a "willing[ness] to
reconsider the plaintiffs' request if the plaintiffs indicate the specific
factual issue or issue for which they in good faith reasonably believe
the requested documents are necessary."' 32 The court may inquire
into whether the request for wider electronic discovery will likely be
duplicative as part of the broader burden versus benefit test.' 
33
b. Requesting party had ample opportunity to discover
A finding that a request for electronic discovery is belated may
relate to the fact that the responding party has already produced
documents in paper form, making the electronic document request
overly burdensome. 134  Another situation in which a request for
132. In re Gen. Instrument Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 96 C 1129, 1999 WL
1072507, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999) (pre-2000 amendment to FRCP 26).
133. Id.
Discovery may be limited if the court determines that "the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit." The
court finds that the likely benefit of the requested discovery is
minimal.... First, the defendants have already produced more than
110,000 pages of documents, including thousands of pages of e-mail.
Given the large number of documents already produced, the court
finds it unlikely that additional documents are necessary. Second, the
plaintiffs have not identified any specific factual issue for which
additional discovery would help them prove their case.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp.,
223 F.R.D. 162, 167-169 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying requests for data stored in
electronic form that are likely duplicative as overly burdensome but granting
those that are likely to provide additional relevant information).
134. Goord, 2002 WL 1007614, at *15-*16:
The parties have spent years, significant sums, and exhaustive efforts
on discovering and analyzing a mountain of paper-a project that,
plaintiffs now claim at the eleventh hour before expiration of the n-th
discovery deadline, was largely useless, or at least superseded,
because the production of electronic data instead would have
accomplished the same thing and more....
.... Nothing in the record suggests that.., the plaintiffs took any
step to seek discovery of any electronic data until after their
adversaries had expended exorbitant sums of public money on
conventional discovery, and until the ultimate deadline for completing
fact discovery, after seven years of litigation, was at last at hand.
Accordingly, the Court is constrained to find that the plaintiffs have
had, and let pass, ample opportunity to obtain this information earlier
in the discovery process, and that that conclusion strongly supports
denying plaintiffs' motion....
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electronic discovery may be deemed belated occurs when the
requesting party has previously indicated that discovery was
completed.1-5 The court may use the inquiry into whether the request
for wider electronic discovery is belated as part of the broader
burden versus benefit test.' 
36
c. Burden versus benefit of additional discovery
The balancing test of 26(b)(2)(iii) is a more global approach
used by courts to assess whether good cause exists to expand the
scope of discovery, and may incorporate the other two tests.
137 Such
a test is by its nature fact specific. 138 In other words, the balancing
... [T]he Court finds that discovery should be denied because
defendants have made a compelling showing that the burden of the
proposed discovery far outweighs its likely benefit for resolving the
issues before the Court, particularly in light of the failure of the
plaintiffs to seek such discovery despite ample opportunity to do so in
a more timely manner, and the vast amount of material, largely
duplicating the contents of the databases now sought, which has
already been provided by the defendants.
135. See Gen. Instrument Corp., 1999 WL 1072507, at *6.
136. See id.
137. See Goord, 2002 WL 1007614, at *10:
All three of the reasons set forth in Rule 26(b)(2) as rationales for
limiting disclosure of otherwise-discoverable information may apply
in this case and require denying discovery of the databases. The most
important reason for this conclusion ... is that set forth in
26(b)(2)(iii) .... [T]his standard largely subsumes the other
considerations reflected in Rules 26(b)(2)(i) and (ii).
138. After analyzing the minimal benefit to the requesting party, see supra
notes 132-133 and accompanying text, the court, in Gen. Instrument Corp.,
discussed the contextualized burden to the responding party and concluded:
The court finds that the burden on defendants would be significant. It
does appear to the court that the requested documents could be
retrieved from the backup tapes without undile expense. Nevertheless,
the technical matter of retrieving the documents from the backup tapes
would be just the start of the process. Defense counsel would then
have to read each e-mail, assess whether the e-mail was responsive,
and then determine whether the e-mail contained privileged
information. Given that the volume of e-mail at issue here is
potentially very large, the court finds that the burden of reviewing the
requested documents would be heavy. The court further notes that
expert discovery is beginning. Forcing defense counsel to engage in
document review would necessarily distract their energies from the
other parts of this ongoing litigation. In weighing the burden of the
requested discovery against its likely benefit, the court finds that the
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test is a flexible standard rather than a per se rule. For instance, the
fact that non-duplicative, relevant data is likely to be produced by a
search of inaccessible data does not necessarily equate to a showing
of good cause. 
139
Other factors considered in the burden versus benefit analysis
include the time involved in satisfying a request for production of
inaccessible documents as well as whether the request appears
focused on the information systems most likely to yield results.
140
"When faced with a request that would impose a significant cost on
the responding party, a court should focus on the marginal utility of
the proposed search."'41
burden outweighs the benefit and that the plaintiffs' motion should
therefore be denied. In making this ruling the court places significant
weight on its finding that the plaintiffs have not identified any specific
factual issue for which they believe the requested documents would be
necessary.
1999 WL 1072507, at *6.
139. Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A.
01CV10287RCL, 2002 WL 32309413, at *2-*3 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002):
The fact that [the producing party] has conducted a thorough search of
[its] existing files does not, however, suggest that a search of back-up
files would only uncover duplicative documents.... [I]n light of the
sheer volume of data on the back-up tapes, it is virtually inconceivable
that they do not contain additional relevant material which would be
appropriate for production.
The fact that the back-up tapes are believed to contain relevant
documents does not end the inquiry....
... Given the nature of the search already conducted and the
burden of providing what is being sought, the burden and expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
140. See Byers v. Ill. State Police, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 740, 755-57
(N.D. Ill. 2002).
141. Id. at 756. Though finding that the burden outweighed the marginal
benefit, the court gave the requesting party the option to obtain electronic
discovery if it would bear the unusual costs associated with its request for
production of e-mails from an eight-year period that would have to be
recovered from an obsolete e-mail program. Id. at 755-57; cf Fennell v. First
Step Designs, Ltd, 83 F.3d 526, 532-534 (1st Cir. 1996) (analyzing the
discovery request made under FRCP 56(f) with reference to FRCP 26(b)(2)(ii),
and upholding the district court's denial of a request for discovery of the
defendant's complete hard drive due to the "substantial risks and costs"
involved and because the plaintiff "did not sufficiently 'set forth a plausible
basis for believing that specified facts, susceptible of collection within a
reasonable time frame, probably exist."').
1628
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2. Cost Shifting
"'Under [the discovery] rules, the presumption is that the
responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery
requests[.]' Nevertheless, a court may protect the responding party
from 'undue burden or expense' by shifting some or all of the costs
of production to the requesting party."' 142 Thus, faced with a difficult
decision about whether to allow discovery of electronic data of
uncertain probative value under either tier one or tier two of
discovery and the somewhat nebulous burden versus benefit analysis,
some courts order production but shift the cost of discovery to the
requesting party.'
43
3. Regulating and Limiting Tier Two Electronic Discovery
As with tier one discovery, the court may regulate tier two
discovery to minimize the burden on the producing party as well as
to protect the producing party's privilege and privacy. 144 Similarly,
142. Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,
428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citations omitted).
143. Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641 (S.D.
Ind. 2000) ("[P]laintiff shall select and pay an expert who will inspect the
computers in question to create a 'mirror image' or 'snapshot' of the hard
drives."), supplemented by No. IP 99-1195-C H/G, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8953 (S.D. Ind. June 15, 2000); see also Rowe Entm 't, 205 F.R.D. at 429-33
(enumerating and applying an eight-factor cost-shifting balancing test resulting
in a denial of the defendant's motion for a protective order thus allowing
discovery of e-mail "to the extent that the plaintiffs shall bear the costs of
production..."); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054
(S.D. Cal. 1999) (holding as part of its order to minimize the burden of
discovery on the defendant that the "Plaintiff will pay the costs associated with
the information recovery"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir.
2002). But see Cognex Corp., 2002 WL 32309413, at *5 ("There is something
inconsistent with our notions of fairness to allow one party to obtain a
heightened level of discovery because it is willing to pay for it.... [O]ur
system of justice will not be enhanced by the courts participating in giving
strategic advantage to those with deeper pockets."). For further in-depth
analysis of cost-shifting, see infra Part IV.
144. Playboy Enters., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1054:
Defendant's privacy and attorney-client privilege will be protected
pursuant to the protocol outlined below, and Defendant's counsel will
have an opportunity to control and review all of the recovered e-mails,
and produce to Plaintiff only those documents that are relevant,
responsive, and non-privileged. Any outside expert retained to
produce the "mirror image" will sign a protective order and will be
acting as an Officer of the Court pursuant to this Order. Thus, this
1629
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 38:1591
the court may narrow overbroad requests by issuing a discovery
order tailored to yield relevant information. 145 It may also use the
various methods described earlier 146 to determine if discoverable
documents even exist; in other words, it may require the responding
party to employ some technological savvy to discover electronic
documents. 147
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee has acknowledged the
importance of a flexible, conditional approach to ensure that
discovery proceeds in a manner that accommodates the concerns of
all parties to the litigation:
The court may-as with any discovery-impose conditions
and terms in ordering discovery of electronically stored
information that is not reasonably accessible .... [S]uch
terms and conditions could include sampling electronically
stored information to gauge the likelihood that relevant
information will be obtained, the importance of that
information, and the burdens and costs of production; limits
Court finds that Defendant's privacy and attorney-client
communications will be sufficiently protected.... Lastly, if the work,
which will take approximately four to eight hours, is coordinated to
accommodate Defendant's schedule as much as possible, the Court
finds that the "down time" for Defendant's computer will result in
minimal business interruption.
145. See Alexander v. FBI, 194 F.R.D. 316, 324-340 (D.D.C. 2000) (pre-
2000 amendment to FRCP 26) (narrowing the plaintiff's broad request for
general production of e-mails from fifty-seven individuals and a general search
by thirty-seven search terms to using one of at most twenty of the search terms
as key words for searching only thirty-three individuals' e-mails for relevant
information).
146. See supra Part III.C.2.b.i.b-e.
147. Itzenson v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.99-4475,
2000 WL 1507422, at *1-*2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2000) (pre-2000 amendment to
FRCP 26):
It is difficult to believe that in the computer era when insurers compile
an array of claims related statistics for internal purposes that defendant
i[s] incapable of at least identifying files with claims for death benefits
involving the operation of a motor vehicle, if not those in which there
was evidence of intoxication....
... [D]efendant [shall] use every practicable means promptly to
identify files over the past five years regarding pertinent claims and
produce them to plaintiff....
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on the amount of information to be p r oduced; and
provisions regarding the cost of production.
E. The Method of Production of Electronic Documents
"The form of production is more important to the exchange of
electronically stored information than of hard-copy materials,
although one format... [of production c]ould be hard copy."'
149
Because there is a range of information potentially contained in
certain electronic formats that simply does not exist in traditional
hard copy document production, the method of production can have
a strong impact on the substance of discovery:
[P]roduction may be sought of information automatically
included in electronic document files but not apparent to the
creator of the document or to readers. Computer programs
may retain draft language, editorial comments, and other
deleted matter (sometimes referred to as "embedded data"
or "embedded edits") in an electronic document file but not
make them apparent to the reader. Information describing
the history, tracking, or management of an electronic
document (sometimes called "metadata") is usually not
apparent to the reader viewing a hard copy or a screen
image. '
50
Sometimes the receiving party cannot easily access even the
core data it seeks in electronic format. For instance, documents may
be written in a proprietary language or in a program or version of a
program long relegated to the annals of quaint computer software
history. 15 1 Further, "databases by their nature disclose more than the
data that is in them."'' 52  Revealing the structure of a computer
program and/or the format of a database may disclose sensitive
148. REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at
12.
149. Id. at 30.
150. Id. at 20.
151. See Jones v. Goord, No. 95 CIV. 8026(GEL), 2002 WL 1007614, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2002) ("In order to enable any statistical use of the
[potentially relevant] data, the [defendant Department of Correctional
Services] would have to affirmatively develop and provide to plaintiffs'
experts the equivalent of a manual on how the data is encoded and
organized.").
152. Id.
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information that is not directly relevant to the controversy. 1
53
Thus, the matter of delivery format where (potential) electronic
production is at issue is a multi-faceted one. The knotty issues
include: what is an electronic document, what are its essential
features, which party gets to choose the form of production, and at
what point in the discovery process. One court ruled that when "a
party already possesses relevant information in electronic form, it is
obligated, by way of mandatory disclosure, to so advise the
adversary. Once advised of the existence of electronic data, a party
may then make an informed decision as to the manner by which
discovery could be produced."' 154 However, the producing "party is
not required to disclose to an adversary, absent an express request by
the party or order of the court, any intention to prepare for trial by
scanning [paper] documents into electronic form."' 155 Another court
ordered production to be made "in the native electronic format (or a
mutually agreeable format)."'
56
153. Id.
By producing the electronic material in raw form, the [defendant
Department of Correctional Services] would disclose not only the
underlying data sought by the plaintiffs, but also the organizational
framework of the databases, which would effectively disclose a great
deal about the way that [its proprietary system] maintains, stores, and
classifies information .... [T]he plaintiffs' demands of necessity
include the production of information that is not strictly speaking
relevant to the case.
Id. In In re Honeywell International, Inc. Securities Litigation, the court held
that any proprietary software the producing party might have to include with
its production of electronic documents to make those documents decipherable
was adequately protected by a stipulated confidentiality order. No. M8-85
(WHP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20602, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2003).
154. In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D 437, 441 (D.N.J.
2002).
155. Id.
156. United States v. First Data & Concord EFS, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 69, 71
(D.D.C. 2003). In Honeywell International, the court ordered that documents
already produced in hard copy form be produced in electronic format because
that is
how the documents are kept in the usual course of business....
... [The] Court directs [the producing party] to produce
electronically its workpapers by either: (1) producing a copy of its
workpapers on CD-ROMs that could be viewed using commercially-
available software; or (2) producing a copy of its workpapers on CD-
ROMs that could be viewed using [the producing party's] proprietary
1632
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Courts are also asked to rule on requests for on-site inspection of
and direct access to the producing party's computer/information
systems. 
57
The proposed amendments to FRCP 34(b) add language that
attempts to clarify the procedures relating to form of discovery and
the duties of the parties: it would allow the requesting party to
"specify the form in which electronically stored information is to be
produced."' 158 The producing party would, in turn, be allowed to
make "an objection to the requested form for producing
electronically stored information, stating the reasons for the
objection."' 59 Finally, a proposed new subsection to the Rule, FRCP
34(b)(ii), would provide that "if a request for electronically stored
software, as well as producing the proprietary software to the extent it
is necessary to view the workpapers....
... Finally, this Court declines [the requesting party's] invitation
to rule on whether [the producing party] may convert some [of] its
workpapers to a PDF file format to protect their integrity.
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20602, at *5-*7 (citations omitted).
157. In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315, 1316-17 (1 lth Cir. 2003) (basing
its conclusion in part on the Advisory Committee's Notes to the 1970
amendments to FRCP 34(a)).
Rule 34(a) does not grant unrestricted, direct access to a respondent's
database compilations. Instead, Rule 34(a) allows a requesting party
to inspect and to copy the product-whether it be a document, disk, or
other device-resulting from the respondent's translation of the data
into a reasonably usable form.
... Rule 34(a) does not give the requesting party the right to conduct
the actual search.
Id. In Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, the court allowed some degree of
intrusion, ruling that the defendant had to provide a third party neutral expert
access to its hard drive in order to copy the drive and recover deleted
documents. 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002). The defendant would then "review any
recovered documents and produce to [the p]laintiff those communications that
are responsive to any earlier requests for documents and are relevant to the
subject matter of this litigation." Id. at 1055. The court explained that the
"[p]laintiff needs to access the hard drive of [the d]efendant's computer only
because [the d]efendant's actions in deleting those [discoverable] e-mails made
it currently impossible to produce the information as a 'document."' Id. at
1053.
158. REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at
26.
159. Id.
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information does not specify the form of production, a responding
party must produce the information in a form in which it is ordinarily
maintained, or in an electronically searchable form. The party need
only produce such information in one form."'
' 60
For more on method of production concerns including the
definition of a document, form of production and metadata concerns,
see supra Part II.
F. Interrogatories
A reasonable search of electronically stored information may
need to be conducted in response to interrogatories. 161 The Civil
Rules Advisory Committee explained how its proposed amendment
to FRCP 33 would clarify the role electronic discovery and
production plays in the response to interrogatories regarding business
records, and acknowledged the issues that may still arise:
The proposed amendments to Rule 33 clarify that an answer
to an interrogatory involving review of business records
should also involve a search of electronically stored
information and permit the responding party to answer by
providing access to that information. Consistent with the
160. Id. at 27. However, the Committee Note discussing the proposed FRCP
34(b)(ii) muddies the waters: "[It] provides that electronically stored
information ordinarily need be produced in only one form, but production in an
additional form may be ordered for good cause. One such ground might be
that the party seeking production cannot use the information in the form in
which it was produced." Id. at 31. The Committee opines that "[a]dvance
communications about the form that will be used for production might avoid
that difficulty." Id.
161. See Hayes v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 363,366 & n.5 (D.
Conn. 2001) (requiring the defendant to electronically search for responsive
files regarding age discrimination claims against it from the date of
implementation of its computerized case management system in response to
the plaintiffs interrogatories, but not requiring the defendant to conduct a
manual search to find claims files from prior to that date for which only a
general computer file listing the names of all types of litigants and the location
of their paper files was available). In Multitechnology Servs. v. Verizon S. W,
the court ordered production of relevant, discoverable electronic information
not discoverable from other sources in response to interrogatories. No. 4:02-
CV-702-Y, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12957, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004),
objection overruled by No. 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13622
(N.D. Tex. July 19, 2004). The court also ordered the litigants to split the cost
incurred by conducting electronic discovery in response to interrogatories. Id.
at *5-*6.
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option to produce hard-copy or paper business records in
response to interrogatories, Rule 33(d) allows a responding
party to substitute access to electronically stored
information for an answer only if the burden of deriving the
answer will be substantially the same for either party.
Under Rule 33(d), a party electing to respond to an
interrogatory by providing electronically stored information
must ensure that the interrogating party is able to locate and
identify it as readily as the responding party, and the
responding party must give the interrogating party a
"reasonable opportunity to examine, audit or inspect" the
information. [It is] recognize[d] that special difficulties
may arise in satisfying these provisions as applied to
electronically stored information. Aspects of the form in
which the information is maintained or the need for a
particular system to make it intelligible may require the
responding party to provide some combination of technical
support, information on application software, or other
assistance. The key question is whether such support
enables the interrogating party to use the electronically
stored information as readily as the responding party. 
162
G. Sanctions
A wide array of penalties is available to courts to sanction
parties for failure to make or cooperate in discovery, including entry
of default judgment against the offending party, designating facts
requested in discovery as established, or making an award of
attorney's fees. 163 Where the decision to sanction a party in the
electronic document arena varies significantly from the analysis in
traditional paper discovery, is in the more complex assessment of
spoliation. 164
162. REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at
14-15.
163. See FED. R. Clv. P. 37.
164. See Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F. Supp. 2d 950, 954-56 (D. Minn. 1999)
(the court was unable to determine that relevant electronic data was destroyed
where the responding party deleted the original version of a discoverable
database, but did produce a copy which it conceded was missing some data
that had been overwritten-it claimed inadvertently-when it made the copy;
coupled with the responding party's delay in turning over discoverable e-mails
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Most-but not all-courts require a level of fault beyond
negligence before imposing a severe sanction-such as
dismissing an action-for a party's failure to preserve
discoverable material, depending in part on whether the
failure has resulted in prejudice. Lesser sanctions-such as
awarding the costs of discovery or attorney's fees-have
been imposed without requiring such high culpability.1
65
One aspect of electronic information that makes the spoliation
determination more difficult is the "unique and necessary feature of
computer systems-the automatic recycling, overwriting, and
alteration of electronically stored information. There is great
uncertainty as to whether and when a party may continue some or all
of the routine recycling or overwriting functions of its computer
system without risk of sanctions." 166  The difficulty in divining
spoliation in the electronic context is illustrated by the gymnastics of
the court in "the fifth written opinion in [Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
LLC] .... In order to decide whether sanctions are warranted, the
following question must be answered: Did [the responding party] fail
to preserve and timely produce relevant information and, if so, did it
act negligently, recklessly, or willfully."'167 The court opined that
"[o]ne of the primary reasons that electronic data is lost is ineffective
communication with information technology personnel.' 68 After a
detailed description of communicative steps taken and missed to
prevent spoliation, the court held that "[t]his case represents a failure
of communication, and that failure falls on counsel and client
alike."' 169 The court then attempted to fashion sanctions that would
primarily "restore [the plaintiff] to the position that she would have
been in had [the responding party] faithfully discharged its discovery
in violation of a court order, the court held that the responding party's
"actions-and his delay in revealing them to the opposing party-set off a
high-tech wild goose chase that has needlessly multiplied the time and expense
of this litigation. Accordingly, the court concludes that monetary sanctions are
appropriate."); see also discussion supra note 56.
165. REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at
19.
166. Id. at 17.
167. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, No. 02 Civ. 1243(SAS), 2004 WL
1620866, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004).
168. Id. at*10.169. Id. at*'10-*'12.
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obligations."' 70  The sanctions ordered included an "adverse
inference instruction with respect to [certain deleted] e-mails ....
pay[ment by the responding party of] the costs of any depositions or
re-depositions required by the late production .... [And] pay[ment
of] the costs of this motion."17 1 In the same case, the sanction for
destruction of a backup tape was merely to pay the cost of producing
a different backup tape that complemented an erroneously restored
backup tape, to "recreate the lion's share of data [from the destroyed]
tape," as well as to pay for re-depositions that might be warranted.1
72
A proposed amendment to FRCP 37 would add a new
subsection in an attempt to provide guidance in the analysis of
spoliation in the electronic data arena:
(f) [Electronically Stored Information.] Unless a party
violated an order in the action requiring it to preserve
electronically stored information, a court may not impose
sanctions under these rules on the party for failing to
provide such information if:
(1) the party took reasonable steps to preserve the
information after it knew or should have known the
information was discoverable in the action; and
(2) the failure resulted from loss of the information
because of the routine operation of the party's
electronic information system. 1
73
See infra Part VII. for a more wide-ranging, detailed discussion
on spoliation, safe harbor and sanctions.
H. Conclusion
Information systems continue to evolve. Lawyers should
continue to educate themselves. While the rules of discovery may be
modified to reflect technological change, in our common law system
170. Id. at* 12.
171. Id. at * 13 (footnotes omitted).
172. Id. at* 14 (footnotes omitted).
173. REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at
31-32. However, the footnote to this proposed new subsection of FRCP 37
acknowledges that the issue is a knotty one: "Some have voiced concerns that
the formulation set out [in the proposed amendment] is inadequate to address
the uncertainties created by the dynamic nature of computer systems and the
information they generate and store." Id. at 32 n.**.
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statutes rarely provide all the answers.
The ways in which information can be generated, communicated
and stored has expanded. At times, trying to fit a contemporary
discovery scenario into the existing rules may seem like trying to
squeeze into a favorite pair of pants. While some unease occurs, the
basic tenets of discovery should provide lawyers the same basic
comfort as that of a well-worn pair of pants that, after all, are only
half a size too small. Lawyers should think of educating themselves
(and their clients) about new information technologies and
approaches to dealing with them in the discovery context, analogous
to adjusting the pants; with careful consideration, minor alterations
can have major results. A sober appreciation of the longstanding
principles governing discovery, filtered through a realistic
understanding of information technology and recent case law, makes
a determination of the scope of discovery and method of production
manageable.
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